dndo การใช้

• DNDO coordinates United States federal efforts to detect and protect against nuclear and radiological terrorism against the United States.
• In addition, the CAARS program was among numerous acquisition programs at DNDO for which appropriate DHS oversight was lacking.
• DNDO also provides standardized threat assessments, technical support, training, and response protocols for federal and non-federal partners.
• Recently DNDO has come under heavy criticism for its failed Advanced Spectroscopic Portal Monitor ( ASP ) and Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography System ( CAARS ) programs.
• This occurred because during the first year or more of the program DNDO and CBP had few discussions about operating requirements for primary inspection lanes at ports of entry.
• In addition, DNDO completed CAARS testing in March 2010; however, as of today, the final test results for two of the three CAARS machines are not yet available.
• DNDO, utilizing its interagency staff, is responsible for the development of the global nuclear detection architecture, the underlying strategy that guides the U . S . government s nuclear detection efforts.
• CAARS machines from various vendors have either been disassembled or sit idle without being tested in a port environment, and CBP is considering whether to allow DNDO to collect operational data in a port environment.
• DNDO conducts its own research, development, test, and evaluation of nuclear and radiological detection technologies, and is responsible for acquiring the technology systems necessary to implement the domestic portions of the global nuclear detection architecture.
• During recent discussions with DNDO officials, they agreed that the language in the budget justifications lacked clarity and stated that they are not planning to complete a cost benefit analysis since such analyses are generally associated with acquisition programs.
• Specifically, DNDO officials told GAO that when they made their course correction and cancelled the acquisition part of the program in 2007, they also decided not to conduct a cost benefit analysis because such analyses are generally needed to justify going forward with acquisitions.
• According to the GAO, from the start of the CAARS program in 2005 until the course correction in December 2007, DNDO planned the acquisition and deployment of CAARS machines without understanding that they would not fit within existing primary inspection lanes at CBP ports of entry.
• The "'Domestic Nuclear Detection Office "'( DNDO ) is a jointly staffed office established April 15, 2005 by the United States to improve the nation s capability to detect and report unauthorized attempts to import, possess, store, develop, or transport nuclear or radiological material for use against the nation, and to further enhance this capability over time.
• For fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2011, DHS justified annual budget requests to Congress by citing significant plans and accomplishments of the CAARS program, including that CAARS technology development and deployment was feasible, even though DNDO had made the decision in December 2007 to cancel the acquisition of CAARS . For example, in its fiscal year 2009 budget justification, DHS stated that a preliminary DNDO / CBP CAARS production and deployment program had been successfully developed and that CAARS machines would be developed that would detect both contraband and shielded nuclear material with little or no impact on CBP operations.
• For fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2011, DHS justified annual budget requests to Congress by citing significant plans and accomplishments of the CAARS program, including that CAARS technology development and deployment was feasible, even though DNDO had made the decision in December 2007 to cancel the acquisition of CAARS . For example, in its fiscal year 2009 budget justification, DHS stated that a preliminary DNDO / CBP CAARS production and deployment program had been successfully developed and that CAARS machines would be developed that would detect both contraband and shielded nuclear material with little or no impact on CBP operations.